Classical Quarterly **35** (i) 43–54 (1985) *Printed in Great Britain*

TISSAPHERNES IN THUCYDIDES

Of all the leading personalities who left their imprint on the history of the Peloponnesian war Tissaphernes was to Thucydides the most enigmatic.[1] Although judgements on the ability and character of individuals occur more frequently in the eighth book of the *History* than in other parts,[2] Thucydides apparently did not feel himself to be in a position to include an explicit judgement on Tissaphernes. Nor does Tissaphernes, unlike many major and minor characters, receive even a brief descriptive introduction, though such introductions are also exceptionally plentiful in the eighth book.[3] Thucydides has been successful in collecting an abundance of detailed information about the part played by Tissaphernes in the opening phase of the Ionian war and yet has failed to produce a satisfactory picture of him. In this paper attention will first be drawn to special problems arising in the case of Tissaphernes which do not arise in the presentation of other leading characters. My main purpose, however, is to attempt to establish that the account of him by Thucydides is basically inconsistent and that this inconsistency occurs because the material in the eighth book has not been fully integrated.

One source of difficulty for Thucydides in writing about Tissaphernes was that he seems to have had little opportunity to acquire knowledge of Persia and the Persians. There is no indication that he spent any part of his exile in or near Asia, and the notorious sparsity of his references to Greek relations with the Persians before the outbreak of the Ionian war suggests that his contacts with them were scanty.[4] In this respect he was not exceptional. Before the end of the fifth century even the best educated Athenians seem to have possessed only a dim or distorted impression of Persia, as is illustrated in different ways by the *Persae* and the *Acharnians*. Thucydides was undoubtedly familiar with the work of Herodotus, but its pictures of leading Persians related to past epochs, mostly long past, and had become largely out of date. The *Persica* of Ctesias, which included detailed, if over-sensational, descriptions of the Persian court under the later Achaemenids, was almost certainly not accessible to Thucydides.[5] The way of life and code of behaviour practised by the Persian aristocracy, of which Tissaphernes was a member,[6] can hardly have been among the subjects with which Thucydides was well acquainted.

[1] F. E. Adcock, *Thucydides and his History* (Cambridge, 1963), 85.

[2] Cf. my *Individuals in Thucydides* (Cambridge, 1968), 5–15.

[3] G. T. Griffith, *Proc. Cambr. Phil. Soc.* 7 (1961), 25–33.

[4] His credulity in accepting the authenticity of a letter from Xerxes to Pausanias (1.129.3), which he probably found in the work of some predecessor, as I suggested in *CQ* 27 (1977), 102–3, points in the same direction. J. M. Cook, *The Persian Empire* (London, 1983), 233 n. 9, is also sceptical about the letter, of which Thucydides gives a summary (4.50.2), allegedly sent by Artaxerxes to the Spartans.

[5] T. S. Brown, *Historia* 27 (1978), 6 gives reasons for believing that 393/2 should be accepted as a *terminus post quem* for the publication of the *Persica*.

[6] All the evidence relating to his career, especially his close links with the Persian court, suggests that he belonged to the limited circle of aristocrats who were largely responsible for the administration of the empire. The Lycian text of the Xanthus stele, *Tituli Asiae Minoris* (ed. E. Kalinka, Vienna, 1901) i. 44c11–12, names his father as Hydarnes. If this Hydarnes is the commander of the Immortals in the invasion of Xerxes, the grandfather of Tissaphernes was the even more celebrated Hydarnes who helped Darius to overthrow the Pseudo-Smerdis. This hypothesis is, however, questionable. Cook, op. cit. (above n. 4) 167, who points out that

A second factor which very probably proved a handicap to him in dealing with Tissaphernes must also be borne in mind. The eighth book is widely, and in my opinion rightly, believed to have been written soon after the events recorded in it and never revised.[7] Consequently Thucydides, when writing it, is most unlikely to have had any opportunity to study later stages in the career of Tissaphernes which might have proved valuable in throwing light on his contribution to the opening phase of the Ionian war. A third factor likely to have caused difficulties for Thucydides was that the influence exerted by Tissaphernes on the course of the war was not primarily through conducting military operations witnessed by many potential informants, since he had only small forces under his command, but through playing a very active part behind the scenes, often in more or less secret discussions attended by a small number of persons. It is true that Thucydides seems to have had a windfall in obtaining information, most probably through intermediaries, from Alcibiades about some discussions in which Tissaphernes was involved.[8] Alcibiades, however, was a somewhat unreliable source and, as Thucydides appreciated (8.81.2–3; 82.3; 88; 108.1),[9] exaggerated his influence over Tissaphernes with the intention of promoting his own interests.

That Thucydides found Tissaphernes somewhat mysterious is clear to any observant reader of the eighth book; that there are inconsistencies in his account of him, as I hope to establish, requires closer investigation. Accordingly it will be necessary to examine the treatment of Tissaphernes first in a group of passages giving information, with or without reservations, about his intentions and feelings (I) and then in the main narrative of the war in Asia (II). In the former his character and his ability will be seen to be far more favourably presented than in the latter. In accordance with Thucydidean practice judgements are normally conveyed to the reader by implication rather than explicitly.

Hydarnes is a not uncommon name in the Persepolis tablets and elsewhere, is justifiably sceptical. D. M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden, 1977), 83–5, accepts the hypothesis, maintaining that Tissaphernes had links with western Asia Minor before being appointed to his first command there. But, (1) though the *oikos* in Caria owned by him in the opening years of the fourth century (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.12 and 4.12) might have been in his possession for a long time, it is far more likely to have been presented to him as a reward for his loyal service to the monarchy (it could have belonged to the rebel Amorges); (2) though the Hydarnes who was 'general of the dwellers on the coast of Asia' (Hdt. 7.135.1) at an unknown date may be identical with the commander of the Immortals, he is not necessarily identical with the father of Tissaphernes. If Tissaphernes had belonged to one of the most celebrated Persian families of the time, the strange fact that in no extant Greek text is he given a patronymic would be even stranger. Lewis rejects, rightly in my opinion, the view that he was the brother of a rebel named Teritouchmes. The attempts by F. W. König, *Archiv für Orientforschung*, 18 (1972), 88–100, especially 93, to find other relatives for him seem somewhat fanciful.

[7] Among the many scholars holding this view are: E. Schwartz, *Geschichtswerk des Thukydides*[2] (Bonn, 1929), 88–91; Adcock, op. cit. (above n. 1), 83–9; A. Andrewes in A. W. Gomme, Andrewes and K. J. Dover, *Historical Commentary on Thucydides* v (Oxford, 1981), especially 4, 251, 373–4, 382 (hereafter cited as Andrewes). In a recent paper J. Pouilloux and F. Salviat, *CRAI* 1983, 376–403, maintain *inter alia* that Thucydides was alive and still writing after 397. Their far-reaching conclusions, which cannot be discussed here, are at least disputable: their claim that the presentation of Tissaphernes in the eighth book is influenced by acquaintance with his machinations after 400 (ibid. 396–7) is in my opinion unconvincing.

[8] This well-known hypothesis cannot be proved but has much to recommend it, as I have attempted to show in *Mnemosyne* (forthcoming). In my opinion, however, it is unrealistic, to draw a neat distinction between passages derived from this source and passages derived from other sources.

[9] Hereafter all references are to the eighth book unless otherwise stated.

I. PASSAGES ON INTENTIONS AND FEELINGS

5.5. Tissaphernes is here stated to have thought that by inflicting damage upon the Athenians he would be in a better position to extract from the Asiatic Greek cities the arrears of tribute demanded of him by Darius; that he would also make Sparta an ally of Persia and, as ordered by the King, capture or kill the rebel Amorges. His reasons for holding these views soon become clear: the military resources at his disposal were so meagre that he could not hope to discharge the obligations laid upon him without external assistance. Hence he made his approach to the Spartans, very probably acting on his own initiative and not on instructions from the King. He also appears to have been personally responsible for the policy of exploiting the financial power of Persia in order to regain control of the Asiatic Greeks. He is in fact here credited with a capacity for intelligent planning.

46.5. Thucydides ends his lengthy account of the advice offered by Alcibiades to Tissaphernes by remarking that the latter for the most part agreed with this advice 'so far as could be inferred from his actions',[10] which are then recorded. He seems to have considered that Tissaphernes showed good sense in accepting the advice to exhaust both sides by prolonging the war.

52. Although this passage is, as it stands, barely coherent, the feelings ascribed to Tissaphernes are fairly clear.[11] He was afraid of the Peloponnesians because of the local superiority in numbers enjoyed by their fleet, but in fact he wished to be persuaded, if at all possible, to assist the Athenians.[12] He may be thought to have been excessively cautious, but his position was a delicate one, as emerges more clearly from the next two passages.

56.2–3. In the account of the meeting at which Tissaphernes, with Alcidiades as his spokesman, conferred with the Athenian envoys led by Peisander, he is seen to have now become unwilling to accept the proposal to transfer his support to Athens. He was more afraid of the Peloponnesians than of the Athenians and still favoured the policy, advocated by Alcibiades, of exhausting both sides (56.2). Thucydides attributes these feelings to Tissaphernes without any reservation, but in the following sentence he cautiously points out that he is expressing his personal opinion (δοκεῖ μοι) in maintaining that Tissaphernes wished the negotiations with Peisander to fail because of his fear of the Peloponnesians (56.3). Tissaphernes has evidently shifted his ground somewhat, but his diplomacy seems to have originated from a shrewd appreciation of the situation rather than from vacillation. This impression is confirmed by the account of his next move.

57. This passage is crucial. After the breakdown of the negotiations with the Athenians Tissaphernes wished to bring back the Peloponnesians from Rhodes and

[10] This cautious phrase (cf. 56.3; 87.4) discloses that Thucydides was not always confident about the authenticity of the intentions and feelings attributed to Tissaphernes, though normally he does not express any doubts.

[11] The difficulties are lucidly expounded by Andrewes 121–3. Doubts may, however, be felt whether the passage refers, as Andrewes maintains, to a conflict of views among the Peloponnesians: Tissaphernes would surely have welcomed such a conflict because it would have tended to impair the effectiveness of their fleet and to nullify any advantage arising from its numerical superiority, which is said to have alarmed him.

[12] It is questionable whether Tissaphernes was ever at all eager to transfer Persian support from Sparta to Athens, but Thucydides was evidently led to believe that he was at this point. The Great King, whose consent would have had to be obtained, would doubtless have been surprised by the proposed transfer and probably reluctant to sanction it, as Lewis, op. cit. (above n. 6) 98, points out.

to heal the breach with them by concluding a new agreement at Caunus. No explanation is offered to account for their favourable response to his conciliatory invitation, but his reasons for issuing it are stated in detail and without reservation.[13] He was afraid that, if he persisted in withholding the subsidy, the consequences would be disastrous: the Peloponnesians would be compelled to fight a sea battle and suffer defeat, or they would lose their crews through desertion, or, worst of all, they would plunder his territory in order to maintain themselves (57.1). Consequently, *τούτων λογισμῷ καὶ προνοίᾳ*, he persisted in his policy of keeping a balance between the opposing sides and, after supplying the Peloponnesians with pay, concluded his third and last treaty with them (57.2). That Thucydides uses the terms *λογισμός* and *πρόνοια* in this context is indeed noteworthy, since both, together with the corresponding verbs, normally denote in the *History* intellectual processes to which he attaches great importance. In the opinion of Thucydidean speakers prudence usually demands that *λογισμός* should be exercised before action is taken (2.11.7; 6.34.4 and 6).[14] *πρόνοια* is an even more valuable attribute: it is ranked as a substantial asset in various public activities both in speeches (2.62.5 and 89.9; 6.13.1) and in narrative (4.108.4). Indeed Thucydides considers it to have been among the outstanding qualities of statesmanship exhibited by Pericles during the period culminating in the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war (2.65.6).[15] Admittedly in the passage where it is applied to Tissaphernes it relates only to his feelings in a single situation, and he is nowhere in the *History* credited with the supreme statesmanlike quality of *ξύνεσις*.[16] Nevertheless he belongs to the select company of leading characters to whose intellectual capacity Thucydides chooses to refer.

59. Tissaphernes is stated to have wished, after concluding his treaty with the Spartans, to be seen to be at least preparing to fulfil his obligations under its terms, including his undertaking to bring the Phoenician fleet into action. It is clear that he was hoodwinking the Spartans, but no disapproval of his fraudulence is implied. The deception of allies, at any rate when prompted by patriotic motives, was to Thucydides a legitimate expedient: he presents with apparent approval the deception practised by Themistocles, whose intellectual powers he greatly admired (1.138.3), on the Spartans (ibid. 90–3). Their relations at that time with their Athenian allies were not unlike those with their ally Tissaphernes in 412/11.

87. Again, according to Thucydides, Tissaphernes deliberately created a misleading impression: his departure for Aspendus, ostensibly to fetch the Phoenician fleet, was designed to lead the Peloponnesians to believe that his aim was to absolve himself from their charges against him. Thucydides here claims to know what Tissaphernes

[13] Andrewes 136–7 suggests that his action may have been prompted by instructions from the King, which is likely enough. Thucydides tends to represent him as largely free to determine his own relations with the Greeks.

[14] On *λογισμός* see P. Huart, *Le vocabulaire de l'analyse psychologique dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide* (Paris, 1968), 330–1, and on *λογίζεσθαι* ibid. 328–30. In perilous situations generals may, not unreasonably, urge their soldiers to discard *λογισμός* (4.10.1 and 92.2), and the term may denote an undesirable activity if qualified by a derogatory adjective (4.108.4).

[15] On *πρόνοια* ibid. 351–2 and on *προνοεῖν* ibid. 350–1. J. de Romilly, *Entretiens Fondation Hardt* 4 (Geneva, 1958), 42–8, shows that to Thucydides prevision was a most valuable element of statesmanship. In 1.138.3 *προορᾶν* is used of Themistocles and in 2.65.5 and 13 *προγιγνώσκειν* of Pericles. Other authors commonly regard the exercise of *πρόνοια* as salutary; cf. Andoc. 1.56; Lys. 26.19; Isocr. 8.83 and 93; Dem. 20.88, and as a characteristic of enlightened leaders, cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.8 (Epaminondas) and *Ages.* 8.5 (Agesilaus); Isocr. 2.6 and *Ep.* 6.9 (needed by rulers) and 5.69 (Philip); Dem. 22.30 (Solon). *λογισμός* and *πρόνοια* are found in close association in Dem. 9.20 and 17.29.

[16] Huart, op. cit. (above n. 14) 311, lists passages in which this term is applied to individuals.

wished others to think (87.1).[17] In the lengthy discussion which follows (87.2–6) he reviews the controversy on the question why Tissaphernes went to Aspendus and yet after a considerable delay there eventually returned without the promised ships. After referring to three current explanations, he produces his own (ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ), to which he had evidently devoted much thought, though it is not altogether convincing. He suggests that Tissaphernes, wishing to exhaust both sides and maintain an equilibrium between them, deliberately prolonged the naval stalemate by lingering at Aspendus and withholding the Phoenician fleet, which, if it had collaborated with the Spartans, would probably have enabled them to win a decisive victory (87.4). This explanation credits Tissaphernes with astuteness in keeping everyone guessing and in making a reasoned assessment of how best to exploit the situation to the advantage of Persia, though in fact, as later became clear, he thereby damaged his own interests.

109. After the Peloponnesians had moved their fleet to the Hellespont, Tissaphernes heard that they had assisted in expelling his garrison from Antandrus, in addition to their approval of similar actions at Miletus and Cnidus. Thucydides describes his reactions: feeling that he had become extremely unpopular with them, he feared that they would take further reprisals against him, and he was angered by the prospect that Pharnabazus, who was now collaborating with them, might achieve, in a shorter time and at less expense, a greater degree of success against the Athenians than he had. Accordingly he decided to beard them at their new headquarters, intending to protest about their hostile action at Antandrus and to defend himself as convincingly as he could against their accusations, especially those relating to the Phoenician fleet. This passage may be deemed to present him in a somewhat less favourable light than any hitherto discussed, but the feelings attributed to him are not to be regarded as discreditable. Thucydides does not appear to believe that Tissaphernes was in a wholly indefensible position in his dispute with the Peloponnesians or that his aversion to being eclipsed by Pharnabazus was palpably reprehensible.[18] Rivalry between leaders, even if it involved the promotion of personal rather than public interests, was considered to be natural.[19] Pharnabazus had in fact earlier shown jealousy of Tissaphernes: his agents sent to Sparta on the eve of the Ionian war had, undoubtedly on his instructions, refused to hand over his financial contribution because of the Spartan decision to lend support initially to the appeal from the Chians and Tissaphernes (8.1; cf. 99).

II. THE MAIN NARRATIVE OF THE WAR IN ASIA[20]

An initial point of some importance is that, whereas Tissaphernes is stated to have been instructed by the King only to extract arrears of tribute from the Asiatic Greeks (5.5), he himself was evidently determined to reduce them to subjection. His aim, which

[17] The phrase ὡς ἐδόκει δή does not denote uncertainty on the part of Thucydides, as some editors and translators have imagined. It is correctly interpreted by Tucker, n. *ad loc.*, 'as he would have them believe'.

[18] At a later stage of his career he treated Pharnabazus with unscrupulous malice, as I have tried to show in *Historia* 30 (1981), 259–64, but Thucydides almost certainly wrote the eighth book long before these developments took place (see above p. 44 with n. 7).

[19] Cf. 5.16.1 on the personal motives of Cleon, Brasidas, Pleistoanax and Nicias. The exception is Pericles; cf. 2.60.5 for his estimate of his own qualities and 2.65.6–10 for the view of Thucydides on his superiority to his self-centred successors.

[20] It will not be necessary to discuss references to minor activities by Tissaphernes, such as his brief visit to Teos (20.2), which throw little or no light on the present investigation.

emerges as the narrative proceeds, is seen most clearly from the first of the documents, reproduced verbatim by Thucydides, which represent successive stages in the negotiations between Sparta and Persia. This first document (18), known as the treaty of Chalcideus (36.2), couples in its heading the name of Tissaphernes with that of the King and stipulates that territory and cities held by the King or his forbears shall be subject to Persia. The Spartans later expressed dissatisfaction with the document on the ground that it favoured Persia unfairly at their expense (36.2), as indeed it did. Its terms were almost certainly drafted by, or at least for, Tissaphernes and reflect his opinion on what the relations between the Greeks and Persia should appropriately be.[21]

Meanwhile, however, military collaboration between him and the Peloponnesians was by no means ineffective. They were defeated by the Athenians near Miletus, where he led his own cavalry and contributed a mercenary contingent (25.2–5), but soon afterwards he persuaded the Peloponnesians, who had been reinforced, to deliver a surprise attack on Iasus, the headquarters of the rebel Amorges. The success of this operation benefited both sides: Tissaphernes discharged his duty to the King by capturing Amorges, while the Peloponnesians were able to reap a rich reward in booty and ransom payments (28.2–4).

Friction now began to develop over the subsidy received by the Peloponnesians from Tissaphernes. In the autumn of 412 he handed over pay for a month at the rate of one drachma for each man but gave notice that in future only half of that amount would be paid unless the King, whom he promised to consult, decreed otherwise. Violent protests led by Hermocrates resulted in only a slight increase (29). The facts of the case are obscure, since Thucydides nowhere states whether a fixed rate had been agreed.[22] Persian kings were notoriously niggardly paymasters, as is pointed out by the Oxyrhynchus historian (19.2, Bartoletti), and Tissaphernes may possibly have lacked the funds needed to provide payment at the earlier rate. On the other hand, he is known to have later been very wealthy (ibid. 19.3), and he was apparently at this time in control of a large area extending beyond his own satrapy (5.4). He could surely, if he had so wished, have raised funds sufficient to maintain the earlier rate at least until he received an answer from the King.[23] Unfortunately Thucydides does not mention either what the King decided or when his decision was received.[24] Because the Peloponnesians were still enjoying the spoils of Iasus, they did not for a time feel the pinch (36.1). Some of them, however, were greatly disconcerted because he had announced so soon that he intended to halve the subsidy: his treatment of them began to suggest that he regarded them rather as mercenaries hired to do his bidding than as partners with rights equal to his own.

The Spartan government must have received disturbing reports about the attitude of Tissaphernes, since the eleven commissioners sent to Ionia in the winter of 412/11

[21] The question whether the Persians acknowledged the concept 'Greeks of Asia' is considered by C. Tuplin, *JHS* 100 (1980), 148–50. Whatever the attitude of Tissaphernes may have been, he evidently chose to claim for Persia as much territory and as many cities as possible occupied by Greeks whether on the Asiatic mainland or outside it. I have discussed the situation from the viewpoint of the Asiatic Greeks in *CQ* 29 (1979), 35–7.

[22] The difficulties are discussed by Andrewes 70; cf. 96–7.

[23] In 45.6 Alcibiades is stated to have defended Tissaphernes, arguing that he was justifiably economical because he was defraying the war costs from his private resources. This testimony is not, however, above suspicion.

[24] Andrewes 142 infers from *κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείμενα* in the third treaty (58.5) that the question had by then been settled, but Lewis, op. cit. (above n. 6) 104 n. 84, is more doubtful. E. Lévy, *BCH* 107 (1983), 221–41, has recently discussed the three treaties.

had instructions to move part of the fleet, if they thought fit, to the Hellespont to collaborate with Pharnabazus (39.2). When the commissioners conferred with Tissaphernes at Cnidus, their resentment against him led to open discord. Lichas, their leader, bluntly declared that the treaties hitherto negotiated were intolerable because they gave the King authority over the Aegean islands and most of northern Greece and that rather than submit to such terms the Spartans would forgo the Persian subsidy. Tissaphernes was furious and stormed out of the meeting, which broke up without achieving anything (43.2–4). The specific point made by Lichas, which caused Tissaphernes to lose his temper, was largely academic: a Persian claim to Greek territory extending as far as the forces of Xerxes had penetrated could hardly in 412 have been seriously pursued to its extreme limits.[25] Yet the quarrel between the two parties was real enough,[26] and for some months it deeply affected the course of the war. The bitterness of their feelings against one another is attested by their willingness to incur considerable risks in dissolving their partnership. The Spartans are said to have believed, largely because of advantages expected to accrue from the revolt of Rhodes, that they could support their fleet from their existing alliance without calling on Tissaphernes (44.1), but the more realistic of them must have had misgivings, which soon proved to be well founded. On his side Tissaphernes could hardly expect, without their assistance in ousting Athenian influence from Asia Minor, to collect the arrears of tribute owed to the King (5.5), and there was a danger that, if they became desperate, they might use their forces against him. The record of his actions since the capture of Iasus suggests that he was both high-handed and short-sighted. By choosing to treat his allies as hirelings and by allowing himself to become so enraged by criticism as to renounce his association with them he compromised both himself and the King.

Within three months both sides came to regret the discontinuance of their partnership and were prepared for a reconciliation, even though it involved some swallowing of pride. Thucydides records this reconciliation exclusively from the viewpoint of Tissaphernes, whose motives are reviewed in some detail (57).[27] The Peloponnesians extracted from the Rhodians only thirty-two talents (44.4), which would not maintain their fleet for a month,[28] and probably they were disappointed by the financial and military assistance obtained not merely from Rhodes but also from other former allies of Athens. They must have reluctantly decided that to continue their operations without a Persian subsidy was impracticable. At least it was gratifying that Tissaphernes took the initiative by inviting them to confer with him at Caunus (57.1), and they must have heard with relief that the attempt by Alcibiades to persuade him to transfer his support to the Athenians had failed (56.4). Their conference with him led to the conclusion of the third treaty (58).

It was not long before complaints were again made against him, but on this occasion they came from the lower ranks, especially the Syracusans, rather than from the leaders. In the summer of 411 there was unrest in the fleet at Miletus, amounting almost to mutiny. It was directed partly against Astyochus for having persistently refused to fight a decisive sea battle while awaiting the Phoenician ships, about which much scepticism was felt. Tissaphernes, however, was also censured for not having brought these ships into the Aegean and for impairing the Peloponnesian fleet by not paying the subsidy regularly or in full (78). The demand for immediate action impelled

[25] Cf. Lewis, op. cit. 99–100; Andrewes 90–1.

[26] According to Andrewes 90, 'the quarrel seems a little artificial'. It is rather the deliberately provocative argument of Lichas that is artificial.

[27] See above pp. 45–6.

[28] Andrewes 92.

Astyochus and representatives of the allies to commit themselves to engage the Athenians without waiting for Tissaphernes and the Phoenician reinforcement. The expected battle did not, however, take place for reasons not relevant here (79). If the complaints against Tissaphernes were valid, as they appear to have been, he was guilty of failing to honour his undertaking to finance the Peloponnesians until the arrival of the Phoenician ships (58.5). He had probably by now received a reply from the King to his appeal for funds,[29] and he could hardly plead any longer that he had to dip into his own pocket. He was apparently determined to treat his Greek allies with autocratic disdain. He also showed remarkable shortsightedness: he had evidently learned nothing from their temporary withdrawal to Rhodes, and he seems to have failed to appreciate that, if he exasperated them beyond endurance, he would damage his own interests by forcing them to turn to Pharnabazus.

His continued niggardliness did indeed very soon produce this result. The Spartans decided to implement the provisional instructions issued to the eleven commissioners by sending forty ships to Pharnabazus, who offered to maintain them (80.1–2). Although three-quarters of this squadron failed to reach the Hellespont and returned to Miletus (80.3), Tissaphernes ought surely to have been warned that by his present policy he was playing into the hands of his rival. On this occasion, however, as on others at later stages of his career, he seems to have been unable, or perhaps unwilling, to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards Greeks even when he would clearly have benefited thereby.

News that Alcibiades had been reinstated by the Athenians at Samos, to whom he was offering much encouragement, intensified the bitterness of the Peloponnesians at Miletus against Tissaphernes,[30] especially as he was even more remiss in providing them with pay (83.1–2). On this occasion the lower ranks were supported in their grievances by some of the officers. Threats of desertion were widespread, and feelings became so violent that Astyochus, who was accused of accepting bribes from Tissaphernes,[31] narrowly escaped being stoned (83.3–84.3). The situation was further aggravated when the Syracusans and other allies welcomed the action of the Milesians in seizing a fort established by Tissaphernes and expelling his garrison (84.4). Relations between him and the Peloponnesians were now at their lowest ebb, and he might almost be thought to have deliberately provoked them.

At this critical moment Mindarus, the new nauarchos, arrived to assume command in succession to Astyochus, who then sailed home (85.1). The following passage is particularly valuable for the light that it throws on the attitude of Tissaphernes towards the Greeks and on their attitude towards him (85.2–3). He sent to Sparta with Astyochus a Greek-speaking agent with instructions to denounce the Milesians for their attack on his fort and to defend him against charges which, as he knew, a Milesian embassy and Hermocrates, both on their way to Sparta, intended to bring against him there. Hermocrates, with whom he had long been at loggerheads on the payment of the subsidy, was determined to accuse him of ruining the Peloponnesian cause in collaboration with Alcibiades and of engaging in double dealing. Here

[29] See above n. 24.

[30] They could not have known that the claims of Alcibiades to be in a position to win the support of Tissaphernes for Athens (81.3) were extravagant and largely fraudulent.

[31] I have tried to establish in *Individuals* (above n. 2), 304–7 and *Mnemosyne* 30 (1977), 348–9 with n. 7, that this accusation was false. Another reason for holding this view is that, if Astyochus had been bribed by Tissaphernes, he could surely, as nauarchos, have devised some means of preventing the dispatch of the forty ships to Pharnabazus (80.1), which has been mentioned above.

Thucydides includes what is almost a personal anecdote.[32] When Hermocrates was dismissed by the Syracusan government and had become an exile, Tissaphernes attacked him even more trenchantly, alleging, among other charges, that Hermocrates had shown malice towards him because he had refused to pay money for which he had asked (85.3).[33] If this story is accurate, Tissaphernes behaved with flagrant vindictiveness in turning to his own advantage the sentence of banishment whereby his most persistent critic had been reduced to relative impotence.

The upshot of the various representations to the Spartan government receives no mention from Thucydides either here (85) or in the few remaining pages of the *History*. Had he given an account of Spartan reactions, it would certainly have been relevant to the present investigation, and the lack of it is most regrettable. A brief reference by Xenophon (*Hell.* 1.1.31)[34] does not provide an adequate clue to what Thucydides might have written.

Meanwhile there had been no improvement in the situation in Ionia. During the absence of Tissaphernes at Aspendus his subordinates had not made any payments to the Peloponnesians at Miletus, who received reliable reports that he would not now fulfil his undertaking to bring back the Phoenician fleet and that his treatment of them was totally dishonest. Accordingly Mindarus, who evidently had authority from Sparta to accept the invitation of Pharnabazus if Tissaphernes continued to behave unsatisfactorily,[35] sailed from Miletus for the Hellespont with almost his whole fleet (99). On hearing this news Tissaphernes hastened back from Aspendus to Ionia (108.3). His further reactions have been discussed above.[36]

CONCLUSION

The differences between the Tissaphernes presented in the passages on intentions and feelings (I) and the Tissaphernes presented in the main narrative of the war in Asia (II) are certainly not on a scale comparable with those between Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde. They are, however, considerable, even if the foregoing analysis may be thought to have exaggerated them somewhat.

In (I) Tissaphernes is a cool and calculating statesman who, handicapped by military weakness, intelligently exploits Persian superiority in financial resources to promote Persian interests. He pursues with caution, perhaps excessive caution, a policy based on rational judgements. Attracted for a time by the persuasive arguments of Alcibiades that he should transfer his support from Sparta to Athens, he eventually rejects this suggestion mainly because of the military risks involved and also perhaps, though Thucydides does not mention this factor, because of misgivings about the reactions of the King. The ultimate failure of his policy, when the Peloponnesians

[32] More or less anecdotic material is rare in the *History*, except in excursuses on early history, but see 5.50.4 and 8.84.5 on Lichas and 8.68.1–2 on Antiphon, where a certain amount of personal detail is given which is not entirely necessary. Cf. A. Momigliano, *Development of Greek Biography* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 34: 'his disinclination to give biographical details is obvious'.

[33] In *Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History* (Manchester, 1969), 194 n. 38 (originally *Ryl. Bull.* 41 [1958], 259 n. 1), I suggested that this accusation by Tissaphernes was a malicious distortion of the protests made by Hermocrates about the payment of the subsidy (29.2; 45.3). The chronological problems raised by 85.3 are fully discussed by Andrewes 281–5.

[34] He states only that at Sparta Hermocrates was believed to be speaking the truth and was supported by Astyochus.

[35] Lewis, op. cit. (above n. 6) 111.

[36] See above p. 47.

withdraw from Ionia to the Hellespont, does not appear to evoke here even an undertone of criticism. Thucydides evidently acknowledges as a general principle that the exercise of λογισμός and πρόνοια, admirable though it is, does not necessarily command success. Of his leading characters to whom he attributes outstanding qualities of intellect Themistocles and Hermocrates became exiles, Antiphon was executed and even Pericles was temporarily rejected.

In (II) the presentation of Tissaphernes is much less favourable, his attitude towards the Greeks being patently both overbearing and short-sighted. He incurs the hatred of the Asiatic Greeks by treating them oppressively and installing garrisons wherever his slender military resources permit. He provokes the Peloponnesian and allied forces, not only their leaders but also the rank and file, by regarding them as hired underlings and exasperates them beyond endurance by pursuing so drastically the policy of paying their subsidy irregularly and on a much reduced scale. Although perhaps not fully capable of anticipating the reactions of Greeks to his treatment of them, he seems rather to choose to ignore their feelings because he wishes to impose his will upon them by establishing himself as their overlord. He shows in the course of his relations with them arrogance, quarrelsomeness, vindictiveness and ruthlessness, which are all characteristics attributed by fifth century Greeks to members of the Persian aristocracy, and the combination of them in him so warps his judgement that he damages both his own interests and those of Persia.

Is there any means of finding a convincing explanation to account for the inconsistency in the presentation of Tissaphernes, which is a phenomenon most unusual in the *History*? It might be argued that (I) is concerned with ability and (II) with character, so that there is no genuine inconsistency; that Tissaphernes is resourceful but evil – the converse of Nicias as presented by Thucydides. The presentation of Nicias is, however, very exceptional in that it dwells upon the moral qualities of a leading character, to which little attention is paid in other cases. Thucydides does not, for example, represent Cleon as an evil man, though probably believing that he was, but rather as the promoter of misguided policies which proved disastrous to Athens. The eighth book does not convey any moral condemnation of Tissaphernes: in (I) he conducts a rational policy with considerable subtlety, whereas in (II) he ruins his own cause through persistent misjudgements. This inconsistency remains.

A more promising line of investigation is to consider the question of the sources from which (I) and (II) might have been derived. The substance of (I) suggests sources favourable, perhaps too favourable, to Tissaphernes; the substance of (II) points more decisively to sources hostile towards him. There is, as has already been noted,[37] a strong case for believing that Thucydides obtained information, probably through intermediaries, from Alcibiades, and much of (I) is likely to have been derived from this source. Alcibiades would certainly have been inclined to have assessed highly the

[37] See above p. 44 with n. 8. Some scholars believe that, where Thucydides attributes intentions and feelings, he bases them merely on inferences from his knowledge of the situation at the time and of subsequent developments and has no further evidence. This can hardly have been his normal practice: sometimes he claims acquaintance with intentions not put into operation (cf. 3.96.2) and with feelings kept secret (cf. 8.17.2) or found to be erroneous (cf. 5.21.3), while most passages on intentions and feelings relate to leading personalities about whom he evidently had full and confidential information. If in the case of Tissaphernes he had inferred his attributions of intentions and feelings solely from his information on the course of the war in Asia, it would indeed have been a formidable task to have explained why the passages discussed in (I) are mainly favourable whereas almost all the narrative discussed in (II) is unfavourable.

qualities of Tissaphernes, who had taken him into his confidence (46.5) and adopted his recommendations, though not to the extent that he claimed. Thucydides, while fully aware that information from this source might be untrustworthy,[38] must have welcomed his good fortune in having the opportunity to hear about the close association between two of the leading figures in the Ionian war. It is true that of the passages included above in (I) the last four (57, 59, 87, 109) can hardly have been based on information derived, directly or indirectly, from Alcibiades. He cannot have attended the conference at Caunus at which the third treaty was negotiated (57, 59) because the Peloponnesians had condemned him to death (45.1), and he had left the court of Tissaphernes and joined the Athenians at Samos (81.1) before Tissaphernes prepared to sail to Aspendus (87.1) and long before he prepared to sail to the Hellespont (109). Nevertheless it may reasonably be believed that in these four passages Thucydides, in dealing with the intentions and feelings of Tissaphernes, is still influenced by the high assessment of his qualities promulgated by Alcibiades.

The account of the war in Asia (II) is written largely from the Peloponnesian point of view and presents Tissaphernes very unfavourably. Most of it is manifestly dependent upon reports from informants on the Peloponnesian side. There are reasons for believing that among the principal eyewitnesses consulted by Thucydides was Hermocrates, who was the most outspoken opponent of Tissaphernes and had valid grounds for detesting him.[39] Almost all members of the Peloponnesian expeditionary force must have found the campaign of 412/11 a most frustrating experience, thanks largely to the attitude of Tissaphernes, and information obtained from them must in most cases have reflected their bitterness towards him.

If the conclusions reached in this investigation have any validity, the presentation of Tissaphernes by Thucydides is very exceptional in two respects. In the first place, no other leading figure in the *History* is presented so inconsistently. It is true that his overall verdict on a few other characters is somewhat equivocal. Among these is Alcibiades, whose career, like that of Tissaphernes, was very probably still in progress when almost all the account of his activities contained in the *History* was written; there is widespread agreement that the celebrated passage in which his military leadership is highly praised (6.15.3–4) is a late addition inserted after he had distinguished himself in Athenian service from 411 onwards.[40] Another prominent figure whose qualities Thucydides does not assess at all clearly is Demosthenes.[41] The case of Tissaphernes is, however, far more remarkable. Thucydides faced exceptional difficulties in forming a considered judgement on the only major character in the *History* who was not a Greek but an inscrutable oriental. Nevertheless the crucial factor responsible for the inconsistent presentation of Tissaphernes is undoubtedly the unrevised condition of

[38] See above p. 44.

[39] That Thucydides obtained information from Hermocrates has been suggested briefly by L. Holzapfel, *Hermes* 28 (1893), 439, by N. G. L. Hammond in *The Speeches in Thucydides* (ed. P. A. Stadter, Chapel Hill, 1973), 53, and by D. Proctor, *The Experience of Thucydides* (Warminster, 1980), 126. This hypothesis is attractive for the following reasons: (1) The Syracusans are mentioned frequently (26.1; 28.2; 61.2; 78; 84.2, 4; 85.3; 104.3; 105.2–3; 106.3), although their contingent seems never to have exceeded twenty-one ships out of a total numbering at times more than one hundred; (2) as already noted, the personal feud between Hermocrates and Tissaphernes is recorded at some length in an almost anecdotic passage (85.2–3); (3) whatever the date may have been at which Hermocrates was banished, he remained until 408 in the Aegean area (Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.13), where Thucydides, also an exile, could well have met and questioned him.

[40] Adcock, op. cit. (above n. 1) 132–5; Dover, op. cit. (above n. 7) 423–6.

[41] *Individuals* (above n. 2) 275–6.

the eighth book, which has led to other imperfections. Evidence about the part played by Tissaphernes has, it appears, been collected from two main sources, or groups of sources, but the process of integrating them has not been implemented. The second unusual feature in the presentation of Tissaphernes is that, because (I) creates a totally different impression of him from that of (II), Thucydides appears to be merely reproducing the verdicts of his sources.[42] In his famous definition of his working methods he insists that he has been on his guard against bias on the part of his informants (1.22.3), and, although he may in some cases have accepted their interpretations which he found convincing, his tendency to reject the opinions of others and the independence of thought which pervades his work suggest that almost all the judgements expressed or implied in it are his own. This second unusual feature doubtless has the same origin as the first. In the eighth book he has assembled an abundance of detail from various sources but has hardly begun the process of welding it into a coherent whole. Had he brought this book to a stage of development to which he evidently brought other parts of the *History*, he would doubtless have made efforts to produce a more consistent presentation of Tissaphernes based on his own judgement. Whether, without obtaining further evidence, his efforts would have yielded convincing results is a question on which it would be unprofitable to speculate.

Finally, it is appropriate to consider which of the two sources, or groups of sources, is historically the more trustworthy in its presentation of Tissaphernes. Here the only criterion of any value is the evidence on later stages of his career, which was almost certainly not available to Thucydides.[43] That evidence, of which very little is demonstrably prejudiced against him, attests that he was arrogant, self-seeking, treacherous and jealous and that he committed errors of judgement largely resulting from his almost fanatical hatred of the Greeks.[44] His undoubted feelings of outrage when he was ignominiously superseded by Cyrus may possibly have had a demoralising influence upon him but can hardly have caused a complete transformation of his personality, and he cannot have held the Greeks wholly responsible for his humiliation. Hence the unfavourable presentation of him in (II), though not unprejudiced, is almost certainly more trustworthy than the mainly favourable presentation of him in (I). Thucydides was perhaps in (I) insufficiently wary of the impression created by information emanating originally from Alcibiades and mistook the oriental wiliness of Tissaphernes, of which he can have had little experience, for the statesmanlike qualities which he so much admired.

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[42] Though not necessarily in both cases, certainly in one of them.

[43] See above p. 44.

[44] As I have attempted to establish in *Historia* 30 (1981), 257–79, for the closing phase of his career from 400 to 395. The evidence for the preceding decade points in the same direction.